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Discussion of the Problem
Within the last tuo years, considerable attention has
been focused on the problem of "cost overrun" or "cost under-
estimation," in Department of Defense expenditures. In
particular,, this notoriety has centered on the advancing
price tags attached to certain weapons systems and programs.
In the past several years, enormous overruns ranging from
300 to 1000 percent have occurred. Th:> s illustrates the
problem. Specifically, the tendency in calculating weapons
systems costs has been to underestimate.
Probably the loudest congressional outcry resulted
from the Air Force contract with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
for procurement of the giant C-5A transport. Senator William
Proxmire and the Joint Subcommittee on Economy in Government,
pointed out that the projected costs of the entire contract
package have risen from $3.4 to $5.3 billion dollars.
••John H. Rukel, "Research and Development Contracting,
Policies and Problems," in Research and Development Contracting
,
(Washington, D.C. : Federal Publications Inc., 1963J, p. 23
2
"The Inflated Case of the C-5A," Armed Forces
Management
.
July 1969, P. 71

Cost overrun is not just a problem of recent years.
Historically, it is worth notd.ng that funding problems had
their roots in times proceeding the first United States
Naval Fleet. On March 27, 1794, Congress authorized the
building of six frigates at a total cost of $688,888.32.
The problems incident to the construction of these frigates
were numerous , and not unlike the problems we encounter
in weapons system acquisition today. It was intended that
the six frigates would be afloat in 1795. However, the
Secretary of War's report to the House of Representatives
in 1794, concerning the progress on the construction of the
ships, told of late delivery. In his report, he noted,
That everything, if not to, be created, must be
modified. The wood of which the frames are to be
made is standing in the forest; the iron for the
cannon lying in its natural bed; and the flax and
hemp perhaps in their seed.
It scon became apparent that only enough live oak
could be delivered to sustain construction of two frigates.
Construction had to be suspended on the remaining ships.
Sources of supply were few and far between. Funds were
reprogrammed to coyer excess costs over the original
estimates. The actual cost came to $926,267.55 for just
three frigates, when six had been estimated to cost
$688,888.32. As a result, there was a Congressional

inquiry into the "apparently enormous" cost of building
three frigates.
In more recent times, the Department of Defense
acknowledged in December 1969, that the projected cost
overruns on 35 major weapons systems amount to nearly
$20 billion. The average growth in costs among these
systems cited was approximately 27 percent against a base-
line estimate of $74 billion. Table 1 lists eight selected
weapons systems and compares the base-line cost estimates
with the current estimates. The total cost overrun is
expressed as a percentage of the base.
Defense managers are worried about the size of
specific overruns. For example, the total overrun may
amount to as much as 395 percent in the case of the Westing-
house Mark 48 torpedo. A June 1964 estimate amounted to
$655 million. The total estimated cost is now $2.8 billion.
In two Navy programs, the DD-963 destroyer and the
DXGN nuclear frigate, the actual contracting state has not
yet been reached and the costs have risen $1.7 billion and
$1.5 billion respectively. Inflation has been cited as the
prime cause for the rise in costs. Whether or not inflation
is really the reason remains to be seen.
* Commander , Naval Supply Systems Command, "Did you
Know," Navy Supply Corps Newsletter, March 1970, p. 70
o
"Taking the Defensive on High Arms Costs,"
Business Week, December 6, 1969, p. 70
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Source: "Taking the Defensive on High Arms Costs,"
Bus ine s s Week , December 1969, p. 70

The foregoing examples of cost overrun are not
isolated or unusual cases. The cases cited in Table 1 are
selected to highlight certain programs where costs have
exceeded the original estimates by more than $1 billion.
This discussion establishes that a severe problem
exists, and that it is more widespread than was commonly
supposed. From the. record of major systems costs, it might
be inferred that this problem is extended to the lessor
programs which, for one reason or another, do not find them-
selves under critical scrutiny from Congress and the public.
Discussion of Specific Aspects of the Problem-
Acquisition of a weapons system is not to be com-
pared to the purchase of an automobile. The latter implies
a fixed, or nearly fixed cost. Procurement of a weapons
system is preceeded by research, development, test and
evaluation. In each stage there exists an element of
uncertainty. This uncertainty may take the form of tech-
nological requirements, performance specifications, time,
labor and materials availability, or production capacity.
Each uncertainty, when related to cost, tends to produce an
upward effect on final costs. In other words, the government
does not simply purchase a system at some stated cost.

The introduction of any uncertainty, generally requires
a prediction. In systems acquisition, the heart of the problem
is the adequacy of cost prediction. The inference is that a
faulty or inadequate estimate of the program costs tend to
result in cost overrun. The elements of the problem are the
specific uncertainties or factors that contribute in some way
to the overall situation.
A review of the Department of Defense record of cost
estimation during the fifties, indicates an apparent bias
toward underestimation.* The degree of underestimation and
the variance of estimation error, seem to be related to the
earliness of the estimate, and also, the type of program in-
volved. Differences between early estimates and final costs
have been smaller for systems where attempted technical advances
were modest. These included non-combatant ships, and cargo
aircraft. Errors in early estimates seem larger for new combat
aircraft with advanced radars, communications, and weapons.
2The same is true for advanced engines and guidance systems.
*A. VJ. Marshall and v7. H. heckling, "Predictability of
the Costs, Time and Success of Development," The Rate and
Direction of _ Invent lye _ Activity ; Economic and Social Factors
,
National Bureau of Economic Research, (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 461-475
^-Norman V. Breckner and Joseph W. Noah, "Costing of
Systems," in De fen se ^ Man.:!; gemen t , ed. by Stephen Enke ,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1967),
pp. 56-57

Even though the relationships between the degree of
system sophistication, cost, and time, seem apparent, the
extent of the overrun "factor" is virtually unknown. Prior
studies however, have uncovered certain characteristics of
cost behavior in systems acquisition. Frederic M. Scherer,
Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, in
testimony before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government,
cited trends in weapons systems costs that occurred in the
past. In a study of 12 major U.S. weapons systems, conducted
eight years ago, it was found that actual systems costs turned
out to be roughly three times the originally predicted costs.
That is, on the average, the overrun factor was on the order
of 220 percent. 1
In the F- 111 program, for example, the actual costs
range from 2.2 to 3.0 times the original cost estimates.
This is practically the same factor observed by Scherer and
his associates. While an overrun factor of 2.0 to 3.0 might
not be representative of all systems acquisitions, the studies
nevertheless highlight the problem experienced in cost estimating
With the correlation between early estimation errors
and increasing costs, it may be argued that the cost estimate
should be developed only after the unknowns are resolved. It
*U..S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military
Bud ge t and National Ecoftomic Priorities, Hearingg , before a
Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 91st Congress, 1st Sess.,
June 9, 1969, p. 378

8is noted, hovzever, that early estimates are required because
elopment resources are constrained. Even if the intention
is to buy partial or sequential development on a system
proposal, it must be selected from a vide range of choices.
The cost estimate is one aid in preliminary evaluation of
developmental proposals. As estimates are revised when con-
fronted with experience, they become credible for analyses
leading to production decisions.
Good cost estimates are extremely important, not only
because weapons systems are becoming more costly, but because
there are so many systems competing for consideration. In
choosing between Vcirious military systems, cost is one element
of choice that cannot be ignored. The cost of one proposal
must be compared with the cost of others to intelligently
weigh costs and benefits. The strategic value of the choice
or trade off may depend on the cost estimate. The problem
then becomes one of accurate prediction while faced with
uncertainty. Intelligent cost estimating is at least as
important in military management and decision making as in
any other sector of government activity or in private business
enterprise.
1 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean , The Economics
of Defense in the Nuclear A?;e t (Forge Village, Mass.: The
Hurray Printing Co., 1965), p. 105

Statement of the Research Question
The foregoing discussion of cost overruns and the
degree of estimating error in development and production
costs leads to the specific research question in this study.
Can the factors contributing to the cost overrun problem be
isolated and analyzed to develop greater certainty in systems
acquisition cost prediction?
An affirmative reply to the question would assume
that
x
first j throughout the systems acquisition process,
certain relationships of activity to cost are present that
will generally hold true throughout. Second, that knowledge
of these relationships, together with intelligent analysis,
can be applied to cost estimating to reduce the degree of
predictive error.
The Scherer testimony before Senator Proxmire '
s
subcommittee would suggest that there may very well be fac-
tors inherent in systems procurement that lead to cost overrun.*
Further, these factors may occur as a multiplier of the original
cost estimate. It is the task of this study to attempt to
identify these factors and determine if they can be applied
to the estimating process to narrow the degree of error.




Scope, Limitations } and Methodology
Scope
The study will concentrate on three broad areas of
the problem. First, a discussion and critical analysis of
the Department of Defense contracting practices. These
generally consisting of fixed price and cost reimbursement
type contracts. A discussion of intangible relationships,
such as government and contractor optimism, will be included.
Second, an analysis of national economic trends from 1958
to the present time., which might contribute to the problem.
Finally, a discussion and analysis of the cost prediction
tools available to the estimator.
.
These tools include
techniques of regression analysis, estimating relationships,
industrial engineering methods, and analogy.
In order to put the study into its proper perspective,
the research question could be further defined in terms of
the study scope as follows: "Are there certain factors
inherent within the Department of Defense contracting process,
the economic trends of the nation, and the predictive methods
available to the estimator, that have a bearing on whether or
not a program exceeds its targeted cost?" "If so, what are
they? " Finally; "If these factors are known, can they be
analyzed and the results used to reduce the seemingly inherent





For purposes of the study, the systems acquisition
process is divided into four stages. These are research and
development, test and evaluation, manufacture and procurement,
and operational. This process division is sufficient to
encompass the entire life cycle of a particular system.
Discussion of factors leading to cost overrun will be limited
to the first three. Mention is made of the operational stage
at this point but will henceforth be disregarded. The rationale
to disregard this stage should become apparent in the following
paragraph.
To concentrate on specific factors contributing to
cost overrun, it is necessary to define the type of "costs"
to be the subject of prediction. Costs are divided into
"recurring" and "non-recurring. I,J- Mon-recurring costs belong
to the research and development and initial investment for
procurement stages in the acquisition process. Recurring
2
costs fit into the operational stage of systems acquisition.
The study will consider only the non-recurring costs associated
with defense procurement. That is, funds used for research,
development, test, and the actual procurement of the system.
As previously stated, the opercitional stage would be disregarded,
lj. P. Large, ed. , "Concepts and Procedures of Cost
Analysis," RM-3589-PR, The Rand Corporation, June 1963






It should bs apparent that costs in the operational stage
are of a recurring nature and not the focus of this study.
To provide an overview of the major cost elements
within a system, Table 2 lists a typical framework describing
recurring and non-recurring costs.
A final limitation is placed on the study, to the
extent that it will concentrate primarily on the acquisition
of aircraft and aircraft weapons systems. Much, though not-
all, of recent public attention to the cost overrun problem,
has been directed tp aircraft procurement. The most note-
worthy example is the C~5A transport. Congressional inquiry
into the C~5A overrun has brought out a great deal of informa-
tion concerning the problem. That information will be used
to present evidence of cost overrun contributory factors.
He th odo logy
P£2J.?.£^._.^§.§iiSLD. • -"Though the study is limited primarily
to the procurement cf aircraft systems, an attempt will be
made to generalize the conclusions that emerge. Inductive
logic is employed to show that cost overrun factors may be
applicable to the procurement of any system. Likewise, the
methods of cost prediction and their problems, may be appli-
cable to acquisitions other than aircraft.
*-U. S . Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military
.foji^ftg '^,_g:?_d _Na t j,ona 1 ^Economic Prior it les 3 _ Hearings , before the
Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 91st Congress,




TYPICAL CLASSIFICATION OF WEAPONS
SYSTEM COST ELEMENTS
I. Research and Development
1. Preliminary Research and Design Studies
2. Design and Development (Of Subsystems)
3. System Test (Of Complete System)
II. Initial Investment
1. Prime Mission Equipment
2. Support Equipment








1. Pay and Allov/ance
2. Equipment and Installations Replacement
3. Equipment and Installations Maintenance
4. Replacement Training
5. Consummables (e.g. fuel, oil, etc.)
6. Recurring Travel, Transportation, and Miscellaneous
Source: Norman V. Breckner and Joseph W. Noah, '"Cos ting
of Systems," De f en se
_
Management „ ed. by-
Stephen Enke
,
(Englev7ood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentiss'
Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 56-57
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Four steps are involved in attempting to isolate cost
overrun contributing factors and show their effect on cost
prediction. First, an examination of present and past
Department of Defense contracting practices, with concentration
on the aspects which may create an overrun tendency. Second,
a critical analysis of present cost predicting tools aimed
at the points least susceptible to control by the estimator.
Third, an examination of the relationship of economic trends
to the systems acquisition process, and their effects on cost.
Finally, the collection and listing of overrun factors that
emerge, together with a deductive analysis of effects that
their control would have on cost prediction.
Data Sources . --Lar^e quantities of information
directly relating to the problem ware brought out by the
Subcommittee on Economy in Government from. January to
November of 1969. The study relies in part on testimony
of noted economists and personnel within the Defense Department,
such as A. E. Fitzgerald, former Deputy for Management Systems,
Department of the Air Force.
Data is also drawn from nuoerous RAND Corporation
studies in cost analysis, cost prediction, procurement con-
tracting, and research and development costs. Further, data is
obtained from a variety of related books, periodicals and reports,
both from within and outside the Department of Defense.
pp. 595-616




A DISCUSSION AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS
Defense Contracting Methods
The vjeapons acquisition process involves three broad
types of contracts.^ These are the firm-fixed-price (FFP),
cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF)
S and incentive contracts. The
Armed Services Procurement Regulations groups the various
contract types into two main classes based on their compensa-
tion features. These are: (1) fixed price contracts, and
(2) cost reimbursement contracts. This classification will
be used to present an explanation of the various contracts.
Fixed Price Contracts
This contract provides for a price that is not subject:
to adjustment by reason of cost experience of the contractor
during performance. Reimbursement may include a certain sum
of money per unit delivered or consist of a lump sum payment
after contract completion. Such a contract is appropriate
where definite systems specifications are available and there




to procure standard commercial items or those military items
where accurate production and cost information is available.
Much of the more routine construction falls in this category.
In practice, the two conditions appropriate for a
fixed-price contract do not always remain static. Specifica-
tions and costs are usually subject to change over the long
run and it is necessary to provide for price adjustments
under certain conditions. These modifications to the firm-
fixed-price contract v?ill be discussed.
Fixed Price with Provisions for E c ; cala tion . - -Ad j us tm :n t
provisions are included in this fixed-price contract. Upon
occurrence of specified contingencies, the contract price
may be adjusted either upward or downward. A reasonable ceiling
is usually imposed on price increases but there is no floor
2limiting downward price adjustments. Increasing costs due
to wage negotiations or rise in material prices during the
contract term would provide a basis for escalation provisions.
£.^Sg ij. .. ?.rA^LJ! ?= *:?L.fe (t determ4nat*ion Provjs ions .--Price
redetermination provisions are attached to the contract and
Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons
Acq u i s i t ion Proce s s
,
(Boston: Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962),
P. 61
AS PR 7-106, 107 prescribes various circumstances and
escalation clauses that may be used.
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may be negotiated either at stated intervals or retroactively
upon contract completion."
Under periodic renegotiation, a firm fixed price is
established initially. Future price redetermination provisions
are included. These provisions state specified intervals at
which price adjustments may be made. In practice, these
intervals are generally one year.
When price negotiation is to be made upon contract
completion, a price ceiling is established initially. The
final price is negotiated after the completion of the contract.
Zlxej3^rjy?e^n_c^ --This contract
consists of a negotiated target cost, a target profit based
on target cost, a price adjustment formula, and a maximum
price ceiling. Final cost is negotiated upon completion of
the contract and the price adjustment formula is used to
determine the profit.
Contractor profits are increased as costs are decreased
below target. Similarly, as costs overrun the target, profits
decrease. The incentive to the contractor revolves around
the price adjustment formula whereby he may increase profits
by cutting actual costs under the target. The formula is
constructed to provide a sharing of cost reduction benefits
*ASPR- 3--404. 5 - .7 prescribes the conditions for use
of price redetermination clauses.
n
^Gilb^rt A. Cuneo , Government Contracts Handbook
(Washington, D.C.: Machinery and Allied Products Institute
and Council for Technological Advancement, 1962), p. 146

18
and increasing cost burden between the contractor and the
Department of Defense. Government liability is limited by
the negotiated ceiling price. Table 3 illustrates a Fixed-




This major class of contract types provides for pay-
ment of all allowable costs incurred in the performance of
the contract. Allowable costs in contract performance are
specified 5.n the Armed Service Procurement Regulations.
Examples of unallowable costs are advertising expenses,
donations, interest, and other .financial costs.
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract (CPFF) . --This contract
provides for the payment of a specified fee in addition to
all allowable costs. The amount of the fee is fixed by law
and the actual costs incurred in the performance of the con-
tract do not change it.
The fee for research and development, or experimental
work is limited by law to 15 percent of estimated costs. The
maximum fee for other work under this type contract is 10 per-
cent. By regulation however, the Department of Defense has
limited these fees to a maximum of 10 percent for R&D and
2
7 percent for other work.
lhSFR 15, part 2
^Frederick T. Koore , "Incentive Contracts," Defense
Management . ed. by Stephen Enke (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:








Target Profit (7%) 140,000
Target Price $2,140,000
Price Adjustment Formula: DOD: 75%
Contractor: 25%
Price Ceiling (125% of Target Cost) $2,500,000




Contractor Profit Target 140,000
25% of Cost Underrun 50,000
Total Profit $ 190,000
Goverumen t Co s t
:
Actual Contractor Cost $1,800,000
Contractor Profit 190,000
Total Cost to Government: $1,990,000
Note: A cost overrun would involve the same calculations
but would result in a decrease in contractor profit
and increase in government cost.
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Cost-Plus- Incentive-Fee Contract . - -A target cost,
target fee, and fee adjustment formula are utilized in this
type contract. Additionally, minimum and maximum fees are
determined. The fee adjustment formula is applied to the
total costs to determine the contractors fee upon completion
of the contract. When actual costs fall below targeted
costs, the result is a higher than targeted fee. The opposite
is. true as well. The final fee, however, may not fall out-
side the negotiated maximum and minimum limits.
it is appropriate to use this type of contract where
the range of cost estimates is large, but not so large as to
justify the use of a cost-plus-f ixed«fee contract. There
must also be a reasonable basis to assume that the contractor
can control a significantly large portion of total costs
through efficient management.
1her Cori trac t s .--In addition to the contract types
mentioned, there are other types such as cost sharing, cost,
time and materials, labor-hour, and open contracts. These
are of minor importance to this discussion and will not be
elaborated upon.
Background of Department of pefense
Contract Preference
Prior to World War II, there were only two main con-
tract types. These were the firm-fixed-price (FFP) and the

21
cost-plus-f ixed-fee (CPFF). The CPFF was much more widely
used to procure military hardware. Incentive contracts were
introduced primarily as a substitute for the CFFF contract.
During the 1950*5, the use of the CPFF contract
increased steadily and accounted for approximately 40 percent
of new contract dollars. By 1966, however, that figure had
decreased to about 5 percent. The incentive contract had
accounted for virtually all of the difference. When the
decline in CPFF contracting began, the slack was taken up by
CPIF and FPIF contracts. Since 1964, however, FP1F usage
has increased only slightly, while CPIF usage has fallen
2
subs tantia 1 ly
.
A Department of Defense drive to increase the use
of fixed price contracts has produced a rapid turnabout,
particularly in Air Force procurement. By 1966, at least
half of Air Force procurement funds were obligated by firm-
fixed- price contracts, yet these contracts accounted for
only 15 percent of research and development purchases and
3
only 9 percent of complete systems purchases.
Complete systems purchases are the major concern of




Gerti L. Brunner and George R. Hall, Air, Force
Procuremen t Pra c t ice s (1964-1966), RM- 543 9- PR (Santa
'






overrun in systems acquisition, primary emphasis is placed
on contracting methods chiefly employed in the past and
present. The current trend in systems acquisition is to
utilize the incentive contract forms, such as FPXF and
CPIF." Table 4 summarizes the Air Force dollar outlay by
contract type for research and development, and complete
system purchases for fiscal years 1964 through 1966. In
research and development, the CPIF tends to be the contract
type most often employed. Similarly, complete systems
acquisitions seem to be made mostly with the FPIF contract.
Critical Assessment of Government Contracting
The Weaknesses of Cos t~ Plus ~FJ^xed^ Fee
The distinguishing features of cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF) contracts are, that the government agrees to pay a
fixed target profit, absorb costs in excess of target costs,
and places relatively little restriction on total costs.
These characteristics appear to offer a reverse incentive for
the contractor to control costs. Since the fee is a fixed
amount, incurring additional costs affects profit only as a
decreasing percentage of total cost. Should the contractor
*FPIF includes fixed price with escalation provisions,
and fixed price redetermination contracts.
^Brunner and Hall note that: "The contractor who
receives the R&D contract for a weapons system will usually
receive the follow- on contract for systems hardware. . .
even though separate contracts may be let for each stage,"
Pp. cit. , p. 27

TABLE 4
AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT BY PRODUCT GROUP AND TYPE
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Source: Gerti L. Brunner and George R. Hall, Mr Force
Procurement, ^Practices ( 1 964-1 966) , RM- 5439- PR
(Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation,
April 1968), p. 15
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come under pressure from the government to meet a work dead-
line, the tendency has been to relax cost controls to meet
the schedule.
Normally, should the contractor overrun the estimated
cost, profit remains constant but decreases as a percentage
of the total cost. It has been argued that this decreasing
rate of profit in an overrun environment, still provides an
incentive for the contractor to control costs. Nash curtly
dismisses this argument as follows:
This (decreasing rate of profit) is surely a minimum
incentive and most commentators have agreed that this
type of contract provides a minimum incentive in the
cost area.
^
Moore notes that it is fairly common for contractors
to benefit from increasing costs with increasing fees. The
parties to the contract tend to use it as a means to order




*The profit can increase if the original work
scope is changed and there are subsequent negotiations
covering the change in program concept.
2Ralph C. Nash, Jr., "Cost Plus Fixed Fee Contracting,"
in Research and Development Contracting, (Washington, D.C.:
Federal Publications, Inc., 1963), p. 109
o
Frederick T. Koore , Military Procurement and
Contracting: An Economic Analysis , RM- 2948- PR (Santa




In a 1962 report, government officials criticized
the disadvantages of the CPFF contract as follows
:
It (CPFF contract) provides little or no incentive
for private managers to reduce costs or otherwise
increase efficiency. Indeed, the cost-plus~f ixed-fee
contract, in combination with strong pressures from
governmental managers to accomplish work on a rapid
time schedule, probably provides incentives for rising
rather than for reducing costs. If a corporation is
judged in terms of whether it accomplishes a result
by a given deadline rather than b}^ whether it accom-
plishes that result at a minimum cost, it will naturally
pay less attention to costs and more attention to speed
of accomplishment. On the other hand, where there is
no given deadline, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract
may serve to prolong the work and induce the contractor
to delay competition.
In recognition of these disadvantages, the government
feas -introduced cost controls over "the years, to monitor con-
tract performance and gain assurance that the contractor is
properly managing the work. Examples of such controls include
requiring the contractor to obtain government approval to
incur overtime costs. Government approval is likewise
required to subcontract work in excess of a specified dollar
2
amount, or to make a product engineering change. The most
recent of these controls was Department of Defense Instruction
No. 7000.2 , entitled "Performance Measurement for Selected
Acquisitions." This instruction was introduced in December
1967. It requires the contractor to adapt his internal
"•Bureau of the Budget, Report to the President on
Government Contracting for Research and Development,
(30 April 1962), p. 32
2AS PR 12-102. 3(a) outlines the requirements for




management control systems to provide data which (1) indicate
work progress, (2) properly relate cost, schedule, and tech-
nical performance, (3) are valid, timely, and auditable, and
(4) supply DOD managers with a practicable level of summariza-
tion. A copy of this instruction will be found in Appendix A.
Such controls are not without their own disadvantages,
both for the contractor and the government. They require
accountants, auditors, and contract administration personnel,
which add another element of cost. With these additional
personnel requirements, the CPFF contract tends to be more
expensive to administer. The controls are a reflection on
the nature of the CPFF contract, in that there is a minimum
incentive for the contractor to control costs. Controls of
this nature would not be required on a firm- fixed-price
contract and are specifically excluded by DOD Instruction 7000.2
Nash holds the belief that the practice of instituting
contract cost controls tends to insert government into con-
2tractors management to a great degree. In addition, the
contractor is subject to close scrutiny of all his contract
costs and may incur expenses in justifying certain costs. If
the contractor realizes that a cost overrun will occur, a
series of discussions, explanations, and justifications may









The interference by government into contractor
management is of questionable benefit .... This
interference is beneficial to neither party and, in
addition, is one of the causes of the failure of
contractors to control costs on CFFF contracts.
*
Apparently, this injection of control to scrutinize
contractor performance has resulted from past abuses of the
CPFF contract.
CPFF contracts are subject to further criticism on
the premise that contract work may be commenced without a
firm estimate of cost. As a result, the Department of
Defense may be constrained in making valid program decisions,
since firm cost estimates are lacking. This further tends
to detract from the reliability of Defense budget estimates.
One additional disadvantage, to which the CPFF is
prone, is called "buying in." In this situation, the con-
tractor may bid an unrealistically low price in order to win
the contract. A cost overrun would result in the contractor
receiving the fixed fee, but a lower percentage of total
cost. It may be argued that the contractor's return on
investment is reduced thereby minimizing the buy-in tendency.
Rudwick, however, believes that if the contractor is short of
other work and cannot maintain production capacity, reduced
2




Bernard H. Rudwick, System s Analysis for Effective




CgL*l.i-.cg; l._ A s pec t s _ o f ^ In cen t iya_J?on trac t in&
The primary purpose of establishing the incentive
contracts was to improve contractor efficiency by lowering
costs and raising the level of performance. The incentives
offered are usually monetary in nature. They may be based
on adherence to cost or price estimates, performance
standards, or both.
Incentive contracting, in general, falls at a relative
point between FFP and CPFF contracts. FFP and GPFF contracts
are tv?o polar cases. The incentive contracts are Fixed Price
with Incentive Fee (FPIF) and Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF).
Both involve a target price or cost,, target profit, and a
sharing formula.
There are certain differences between FPIF and CPIF
contracts. The FPIF contract usually sets a price ceiling
expressed as a percentage of the target cost. The CPIF
does not. CPIF contracts generally possess no requirement
that the task be completed within the limits of the funds
in the contract. However, a maximum and minimum fee are
specified.
The FPIF contract is the type most commonly employed
in complete systems acquisition. Table 4 tends to support
this assertion. For this reason, the discussion will be
*Moore, Op. Cit.
, p . 221
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directed to the FPIF contract. However, Fitzgerald believes
that the disadvantages of FPIF are also common to CPIF
contracts .
-
Probably the most serious obstacle to effective
incentive contracting is the difficulty in setting the initial
target costs or prices. These contracts have been criticized
for poor estimation of targets, particularly for setting
the target price artificially high. If the target price is
set higher than the expected price, the contractor is in a
better position to "remain within the target, and perhaps
incur an underrun. The extra profits, based on the sharing
formula, would appear to result from contractor efficiency,
but would actually be due to an artificial estimate.
Past trends seem to indicate that costs of military
items are not estimated with the same accuracy as their
2
counterpart commercial items. In this respect, the position
of the Department of Defense is adverse to that of the
contractor. The government's position is to negotiate a
target price as close to expected levels as possible. On the
other hand, actual costs may increase sharply during the work,
and the contractor's strategy is to avoid serious cost over-
runs. The overrun could deplete profits in accordance with
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Military
.ftud.oe.t: _and J^?a tienal Economic , be f ore a
Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 91st Congress,





the terms of the sharing formula. The tendency is for the
contractor to attempt to negotiate a target price that
exceeds his expected costs. The gravity of this situation
is stated by Koore as follows:
To hand a contractor a Large windfall profit that
results from an exaggerated target cost is the anti-
thesis of an incentive 5 and weakens the effectiveness
of the sharing formula. *-
Negotiations for the hark 11 Avionics system for
the F-lil with Autonetics, appear to exhibit both the
tendency to exaggerate the initial estimate of cost, and
also poor estimating of actual program costs. The original
contract included a target price of $145.3 million. The
price was based on a target cost of $132.2 million proposed
by Autonetics, a profit of 10 percent, e<<id a ceiling price
of 120 percent of target cost. Autonetics* original
estimate was for $183 million, but agreed to reduce this by
$38 million in order to obtain the contract.
It soon became apparent that Autonetics would be unable
to meet even the contract ceiling price. In the period from
September 1966, through March 1967, Autonetics made five new
price estimates. Each was higher than the previous. By
early 1968, it became apparent that the actual costs might
reach $320 million. Though all the reasons for the cost
l]MA. » P. 22 °
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Military




overrun are unknown , a substantial portion has been attributed
to design changes made by the contractor. At least $60
million was attributed to estimating error. The exact
particulars of the estimating error are not specified.
On one hand, Autonetics was accused of submitting
an artificially high bid of $183 million. When design and
performance problems arose, costs rose rapidly, and some
estimating error was uncovered. When costs approached
$320 million, Autonetics was accused of making a "buy- in"
bid. This latter charge will be discussed in the following
section.
Buy- In Bidding; on Incentive .Contracts . - - The co s t
-
plus-f ixcd~fee contract was previously criticized due to
its susceptibility to a buy-in by contractors. The reason
given was that there was little incentive to control costs
and the contractor could make an unrealistically low bid.
His fee would be affected only as a lower percentage of
the expected costs. The incentive contracts were introduced
with the intention, not only of controlling cost and improving
performance, but of eliminating the buy- in bid. Introduc-
tion of a ceiling price, and decreasing profit pattern in
the overrun situation, were intended to eliminate this
tendency.
*U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Military




Experience with the C-5A and hark II Avionics System
seem to indicate that the incentive provisions of cor tract ing
are not eliminating the buy- in. Concerning the hark II
contract, Major General Murphy pointed out the apparent
intentions of Autonetics in their bid submissions:
It appears that the contractor knew very well
what he was getting into but was so intent on winning
the contract, that he was willing to buy in at a low
price.
*
The rationale advanced by General Murphy for the
Autonetics bid are stated as follows:
The contractor believed that he would not be held
to the written agreements made at the time of source
selection.
. . .
Autonetics adopted the strategy of
repfoposing without regard to the original contract,
contending that the contract was not valid. The
company failed to recognize, or did not believe, that
the procurement system was shifting from oral promises
to written agreements. ... If it fails to enforce
the contract, the Air Force and the Department of
Defense can count on many more years of misleading
promises from contractors and failures to meet
contractual requirements . '-
Mr. A. E. Fitzgerald, in testimony before the
Prcxmire Committee, contended that there was similar evi-
dence of a buy- in by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in
3the C-5A contract. Both contracts were Fixed- Price- Incentive-
Fee.
Major General John R. Murphy, Director, Legislative
Division, Department of the Air Force, in a letter to Senator
William Proxmire (Washington, D.C. : June 20, 1969)
2 Ibid.





In the Light of this testimony, it appears that the
buy- in tendency is present in the incentive contracts, as
well as cost reimbursement types.
Uncertainties Affecting the
Target Cost Estimate
To deal effectively with a target cost estimate,
the degree of uncertainty must be considered. Probably the
foremost uncertainty encountered in weapons system acquisition
is techno logical uncertainty. The degree of technological
uncertainty tends to influence the accuracy of the cost
estimate.
If a system to be procured incorporates components
and design which have been utilized in previous systems, the
degree of uncertainty tends to be reduced. The task of
arriving at a reasonable cost estimate is less demanding.
Previous experience could provide adequate data on which new
systems costs could be based. Such is not always the case.
Modern weapons systems are characterized by increasingly
complex components and advanced performance requirements.
Schultze states:
The increase in complexity is driving the costs of
systems to a point 10 to 20 times what they cost at
the time of the Korean conflict.
The point at issue is that considerable technological
advancement is inherent with this increasing complexity.
* Charles I. Schultze, in testimony before the
Subcommittee on Economy in Government, OpJ___Cit. , p. 65
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There tends to bo an insufficient prior data base on which
to make cost estimates for future systems.
Another uncertainty affecting the original target
cost is uncertainty in ultimate performance requirements.
At the time development is commenced, the final system form
may not be specifically defined. Changes may be introduced
by dynamic tactical requirements, or brought about by
achieving a new level in the state of the art. Once the
system has been initially costed, any further changes will
tend to bring on increasing prices.
In this situation, changes to the target cost initiated
by the government, are usuall}7 subject to negotiation.
Government responsible changes in the Mark II system were
reported to be $20.2 million.
Optimism in Program Decisions
Getting a new weapons program going is not easy,
As discussed, there are substantial risks and uncertainties.
Realistic cost estimates tend to have a sobering effect on
the Department of Defense hierarchy. Perhaps, a realistic
estimate of the cost of a proposal, may place it in an
unattractive position before the Congress. For this reason,
considerable optimism tends to pervade initial program
decision making, both on the part of the contractor and
p. 379





the Department of Defense. Seherer comments on this tendency
as follov7s:
Industrialists and military officers are inclined
to view a programs future prospects through rose tinted
glasses. There is a common belief that one should not
rock the boat vigorously through criticism at the start
of a program. The assumption is that troubles can be
pin pointed and corrected later on when the program has
its momentum. This attitude contributes significantly
to the subsequent appearance of cost overruns, and it
can lead to seriously defective decisions.
Initial optimism has been evident in several past
programs, notably the Skybolt and Nike-Hercules air defense
missle system.
The contractor for the Skybolt program was the
Douglas Aircraft Company. In 1958, Douglas competed for
the Minutcman ICBM program, but lost the competition to
Boeing. After this defeat, Douglas found its backlog
situation desperate. Skybolt seemed to be the best oppor-
tunity, and it competed aggressively in the design competition.
It abandoned its traditionally conservative engineering
philosophy. It accepted extreme technical risks in order
to promise maximum technical performance. It underestimated
the difficulties of the Skybolt development tasks, submitting
optimistic cost and delivery date estimations in the expecta-
tion that it would be bailed out a year or so later when the
final contract provisions were estimated.





. f p. 380
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By 1962, the cost of the program, originally
estimated at $890 million, had risen to $3 billion, and
was still climbing. The program was eventually cancelled.
The second case involved the Nike-Hercules air
defense missle system. The prime contractor was Western
Electric. Formal development began in 1953. At the time,
the research and development team presented estimates of
the costs to convert the existing Nike-Ajax units to use
the Nike-Hercules. They said it could be done at $210,000
per battery through a field modification. However, two
years later, during contract negotiations, they presented
a new estimate. They then said that it would not be possible
to make rnodif ications in the field* and instead should produce
the equipment at the factory for $1.7 million psr unit,
Scherer comments on this case as follows:
Western Electric officials admitted that their
production engineering staff members knew early in
the program that a field modification would prove to
be impractical, but that they presented the highly
optimistic cost estimates because they were more
sellable to the Army and Congress.






A DISCUSSION OF COST ESTIMATING
METHODS AND PROBLEMS
Criticisms leveled at the incentive contract series
in the previous discussion cited "realistic target costs"
as being a key contractor performance determinant. Had the
target cost been set unrealistically high, any underruns
resulting during contract performance might appear to be
contractor efficiency, when in fact poor estimating tech-
nique could really be the reason. Similarly, in a cost
overrun situation, a probable explanatory factor is bad
estimation. Robert N. Anthony, former Comptroller for the
Department of Defense, stated the relationship of estimating
to the quality of incentive contracting before the Subcommittee
on Economy in Government:
It (incentive contract) is a good contract,
provided you can estimate the costs.
Does not preclude the possibility of an intentional
underestimate such as the "buy-in" bid. Peck and Scherer state:
"Cost quotations were deliberately underestimated by contractors
in order to sell the program to the services," in Tl^_We^ons
A£gP:!?A!Ll9AL E2-lQ£v..ris , (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962), p. 19
2 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military
BTid^;et_and_ Nation il Economic Priorities^ Hearings , before a
Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 91st Congress, 1st




This comment provides an introduction for a discussion
of cost estimating techniques, their problems, and their
relation to cost overrun.
Definition and Perspective
A cost estimate, as used in this discussion, is a
judgement or opinion, regarding the non-recurring cost of
acquiring a weapon system; to include research, development,
test, evaluation, production and procurement, but generally
not the recurring costs of operation and maintenance.
In the acquisition of a system, such as the Mark 11,
estimates of cost are made at various stages in the process
.
Breekner and Noah noted that estimation accuracy tends to
increase as the system progresses in development. They
attribute this tendency to experience gained in converting
2
unknowns to knowns. So as not to confuse experience refine-
ments with early estimates, cost estimating, as used herein,
shall refer primarily to the "initial systems cost estimate."
Cost Estimating Techniques
The techniques used for estimating systems costs range
from intuition at one extreme, to a detailed application of
"Autonetics made total cost revisions in June 1966,
June 1967, and January 1968. These are itemized in detail in
testimony before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government,





2Norman V. Breckner and Joseph vl . Noah, "Costing of
Systems," in Defense Management , ed. by Stephen Enke
,
(Englcv?ood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 57
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labor and material cost standards at the other. The Air
Force cost estimating manual lists five basic cost estimating
methods. These are Industrial Engineering Standards; rates,
factors and catalogue prices; estimating relationships;
specific analogies; and expert opinion. Other sources
describe cost estimating methods as synthesis and analysis;
round table estimating; estimating by comparison; detailed
estimating; analytical appraisal; comparative analysis;
2
statistical; and standards.
This discussion shall not be all comprehensive but
will limit the examination to three techniques; the
Industrial Engineering approach, analogy, and the statis-
tical approach.
Cost Estimating by Industrial Engineering Procedures
Estimating by Industrial Engineering procedures is
broadly defined as an examination of separate segments of
work at a low level of detail and a synthesis of the many
detailed estimates into a total. At the lowest level of
detail, the estimator begins with a set of drawings and
spec5.fies each engineering or production operation that will
be required, the work stations where each operation will be
performed , and the labor and material that will be required.
1AFSC Manual 173-1
^J. P. Large, An Introduction to Equipmen t Cost








The detail required at the lowest level of estimation
is illustrated in Table 5. Formation of a center bracket
of steel plate is the example used. The name and number of
the operations and the machine that will be used are given,
along with estimates of the set-up time and operating labor
cost. Standard set~up and operating costs are used in
making the estimates whenever these exist. If standards
have not been established, a detailed study is made to
determine the most efficient method of performing each
1
operation.
The low level estimates are aggregated at each
succeeding level, until a cost estimate for the entire
system is attained. For example, the bracket: in Table 5
could be a basic part of an airplane wing. The estimates
for all the parts constituting that wing are assembled
and totaled to estimate the cost of the wind. Likewise,
the aggregated costs of the fuselage, landing gear, engines,
and remaining subsystems are brought together and totaled.
The result is the cost estimate for the aircraft. One of
the largest aerosp-ce firms figures that approximately
4500 estimates of this type are required to estimate the
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Cost Estimating by Analogy
Estimating by analogy derives the cost estimate
by looking at experiences acquired in the production of
a past system, and applying these experiences to the
production of a future system, given certain likenesses
and differences. For example, if System A required
100,000 direct labor hours, given the likenesses and
differences in design and performance of proposed System B,
the requirement for B might b^ estimated to be 125,000
hours. Starting in the 1950' s, aircraft companies bidding
on ballistic missle programs drew analogies between air-
craft and missies to develop cost estimates for the missies.
J. P. Large cites an example of drawing an analogy from
aircraft production and extending this experience to a
proposed missle system:
Douglas Aircraft Company made a good cost estimate
on the Thor intermediate range ballistic missle by
comparing Thor with the Douglas DC-4 transport
airplane.
*
Douglas encountered a different situation at a later
time when attempting to apply experiences gained in Thor
construction to cost estimates of the Saturn S-IV stage.
After adjusting for differences in size, the number of
engines, higher performance and insulation problems, the cost
2








Statistical Techniques in Cost Estimation
In the statistical approach to cost estimating,
explanatory variables such as weight, speed, power,
frequency, and thrust, are used to develop estimating
relationships. The estimating relationships in turn, are
relied upon to predict costs of the system. Host estimating
relationships are simple statements indicating that the cost
of some system is directly proportional to the weight, area,
volume, or some other physical characteristic of that system.
The emphasis is not on statistical theory or the
computational aspects of statistics. Rather, some basic
considerations are presented, which are involved in developing




Es time? ting Relationship and_Regres s ion
Analysis .»-An estimating relationship assumes that there
is some direct relationship between cost and some other
explanatory variable. The problem is to discover the
appropriate relationship. This is done by first, deciding
what variables are logically or theoretically related to
cost, and then, by looking for patterns in the data that
suggest a relationship between cost and these variables.
Large indicates that weight is a widely used explanatory
variable because of the generally held belief that as an
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aircraft, ship or missle increases in weight, it becomes
more costly.
To illustrate this concept , assume that data were
available on 10 previously produced aircraft. Figure 3.
lists cost and weight data on 10 hypothetical aircraft.
If this data were displayed graphically, it would immediately
become evident that the data conform to a straight line. The
apparent relationship between cost and weight in this example
is a linear function. The equation of this line would be:
y ~ a-hbx
The independent variable "y" (cost) is a function of some
constant "a" ($2,500,000), plus the product of the aircraft
2
weight (x), and the slope of the line (b). The resulting
line is a regression lino of "y !! on "x. " An estimation of
the value of a variable "y" (cost) can be obtained from a
corresponding value of "x" (weight), from the regression
3line which f?.ts the data.
The estimating relationship is the regression equation
obtained from the data. To apply this estimating relationship
to the construction of a new aircraft, suppose the weight of
1 Ibid.
, p. 33
^Mathematical derivation of a linear function is
presented by John E. Freund , College Mathematics with Business
Applicn tions > (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentiss-Hall, Inc.,
1969) pp. 91-95
•^Murray R. Spiegel, Theory and Problems of Statistics ,




























































the proposed aircraft is to be 300,000 pounds. Utilizing the
e s t ima ting equation
:
Cost ~ 2,500,000 + 20 (300,000)
^ 8,500,000.
Assuming that the cost to weight relationship is valid, the
cost estimator might state that the cost of a 300,000 pound
aircraft would be approximately $8.5 million, based on
prior experience.
In actual practice, the values of aircraft cost to
weight would not usually correspond exactly to a straight
line when graphed. Exact correspondence would be extremely
rare. To derive a useful relationship in that case, the
estimator could attempt to approximate a linear regression
line by applying the method of least squares to fit a
2
straight line to the data. The problem is to derive esti-
mates of the parameters of "a" (constant) and "b" (slope of
the regression line), such that the regression equation will
approximate the sample data as closely as possible. The values
of "a" and "b" are determined by the requirement that the sum
of the square of the deviations of the sample observations
from the regression line will be at a minimum. The two
normal equations for linear regression are:
1 Large, Op. Cit
. . p. 36
^Computational techniques of the Least Squares








2y = na + tgx
Jyx = ajx : bj>
In this examp 1e
:
y = cost of the aircraft
x - weight of the aircraft
n - numbor of observations in the sample
2 ~ cum of
Substituting the appropriate values of x, y, and n
into the normal regression equations, and solving simul-
taneously, yields the linear equation of the form y = a + bx
for the regression line of bast fit to the aircraft data.
The usefulness of cost prediction of a regression
line depends on the extent of the 'dispersion of observed
values about the line. The greater the dispersion of
observed values of y about the regression line, the less
accurate estimates based on the line are likely to be.
Higher tei chnique s of,_re:*re s s ion^ana ly s is . - - An
examination of graphically portrayed data of cost and weight
might indicate that a linear relationship is appropriate.
However, it cannot be concluded definitely that some type of
non~ linear relationship might not be preferable. One form





. T p. 41
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The variables of the equation are transformed
logarithmic ly. The resulting equation is linear in the
logarithms of the variables:
Log y = log a 4- b (log x)
The first step is to take the original data for x
and y contained in Figure 1 , and convert these data to
logarithms. The next step is a simple linear regression
analysis of the data in logarithmic form.
A third form of regression analysis considers the
effect on cost of more than one variable. This technique
is known as Multiple Regression Analysis. An example of
this technique would be analysis of the effect on cost of
2both weight and speed, or weight and thrust. The equation
of multiple regression is of the form:
z = a -j- bx -f cy
Problems with Cost: Estimating Methods
Industrial. Engineering; Procedures
Cost estimating by Industrial Engineering procedures
requires numerous detailed estimates starting at a low level
of detail. It was previously cited that approximately
4500 estimates were required to estimate the cost of a typical
1ifeM. , PP. 50-53
2
The computational aspects of multiple regression
analysis are relatively involved. For treatment of computa-
tion as well as a mathematical derivation of the equation, tl
reader is referred to J. P. Large, An Introduction to Equipment




airframe. For that reason, Industrial Engineering estimates
are time consuming and costly. They require more personnel
and data than are likely to be available to government
estimators.
Industrial Engineering estimates have- been found to
be less accurate than statistical estimates in many cases.
Large states that the reason for this is:
That the whole general ly„ turns out to be greater
than the sum of the parts.
Because of this reason, and for cost, time and personnel
considerations, aircraft manufacturers and government
estimators tend to avoid using the industrial engineering
approach.
Industrial Engineering estimators must also work
with the uncertainties that are common in aircraft production,
technological uncertainty being the foremost. As systems
become increasingly complex, the difficulty lies in specif-
ically defining the character of the proposed system. To
make a reliable estimate of manufacturing costs, the estimator
4
must know all the elements that go into them. Experience
has indicated that changes or modifications are made to system
specifications at different stages of development and12-}
JLkid. > P« 2 Ibid. , p. 5 J Ibid. , p. 6
^Thomas F. McNeill and Donald S. Clark, £qst
Estimating and Contract Price
,
(New York: American
Elsevier Publishing Company Inc., 1966), p. 154
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production. For example, Autonetics made significant changes
to its de-signs of the Hark II Avionics system after initial
cost estimates had been made. These changes were made while
development was going on in parallel in order to meet the
original performance specifications.
It is clear that changes of this nature could have a
considerable impact on initial cost estimates. The Industrial
Engineering estimator, working from sketches, blueprints, or
word descriptions of some item that has not been completely
designed is at a disadvantage. lie can assign costs only to
that work he knows about in advance. Even assuming thcit no
design changes were made through the first production run of
a particular aircraft, experience -shows a tendency for produc-
tion runs of like models to be of limited length and charac-
terized by numerous design changes. Production rates have
tended to vary frequently and unexpectedly, with the subsequent
introduction of new or changed components. Large notes that:
The proportion of new components introduced during
a production cycle is probably higher in the airframe
industry than in any other.
These changes cannot be known to the estimator in advance, thus
the tendency to introduce error into the initial cost estimates.
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military
Budget and National .Econpmic^Pjrior;ities v Hearings , before the








The major drawback to cost estimating by analogy is
stated by Large:
Estimating by Analogy is essentially an intuitive
process, and as a consequence requires considerable
experience and judgement to be done successfully.
Statistical. procedures are preferable in most
situations.
*
In spite of this drawback, Large explains that it may
be necessary to resort to the method of Analogy in some cir-
cumstances because the available data do not provide a
systematic basis for estimating cost behavior. The Douglas
Aircraft Company based missle cost estimates on aircraft
production experience, as previously cited, A great change
in technological requirements in that case left relatively
little experience data on which to base a cost estimate.
S tatistical Techniques
An estimating relationship can only be derived from
information on what has occurred in the past. The past is
not always a reliable guide as to what will occur in the
future. Thus, statistical estimating is subject to uncertaintie:
which also tended to be drawbacks to Industrial Engineering or
Analogy estimating techniques.
The uncertainties to which statistical estimating is




lki£. , P. 7
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(1) The uncertainty inherent in any application of
statistics.
(2) The uncertainty that an estimating relationship
is applicable to a particular system.
Concerning the first; source of statistical uncertainty,
little need be said, other than a v7ord of caution stated by
P'reund
:
So far as forecasting and estimating from statistical
data is concerned, it must be j:c: ' : red that any pro-
jection of past experience. to the uncertain future is
speculative' and hazardous. *
On the second source of uncertainty, whether or not
the estimating relationship is applicable to a particular
system, the question of the reliability of the predicting
equation is raised. Contrary to what the regression equation
may indicate, cost and the explanatory variable may not be
related in the same manner. A particular sample could show
such a relationship out of pure chance v;hen in fact none
exists. Further, the regression equation is only one of a
large number that could ba obtained from different samples
from within the same population. In other words, the
predicted cost, may not be the true cost.
* John E . Freund , El ementarv Business Statis t ics ,
(Englewood Cliffs, M.J.: Prentiss-Hall, Inc.
, 1964), p. 347
2
•Methods of evaluating the reliability of certain data
within established or theoretical limits exists. Examples of
such techniques include the theories of probability and
correlation. It is not within the scope of this paper to
elaborate upon these techniques. Theoretical presentations
of this material arc made by W. A. Spurr and C. P. Bonini,

53
The Relationship of Cost Estimating
Uncertainties to Cost Overrun
From a discussion of cost estimating by Industrial
Engineering Techniques, Analogy, or statistics, one thing
is evident. Whatever problems may be inherent to each
method, they all share uncertainty as a factor which lessens
their effectiveness. The question is: To what degree does
uncertainty in cost estimation influence the final cost of
the system? Experience during the 1950* s showed that there
was often a large difference between original estimates and
the final costs of a number of weapons systems. The Depart-
ment of Defense began looking at case histories of major
weapons systems in an attempt to identify the reasons for
the discrepancies. In particular, the Department wanted
to know if the reasons for the cost overruns were bad
estimating, or some other factor.
Table 6 lists 16 aircraft and 6 missies developed
prior to 1958 along with the ratio of actual cost to initial
estimate. The ratio is shown as the factor increase. The
main point of interest is the reason for these increases
and, specifically, if they are due to bad estimating. A
study of the development histories of the equipment shown
S ta t i s v ica 1 An a 1y s i s for Bus in e s s De c i s ion s , (Homewood , 111.
R. D. Irwin, Inc., 1967) and John E. Freund , Elemen tary
Business Statistics^, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentiss-
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in Table 5 was made in an attempt to answer this question.
The study led to the following conclusions:
When early estimates are made of what it will cost
to p2.*oduce or develop something new, the estimator
typically bases his estimate on the current design and
the currently planned program for development. If he
is estimating cost of production, he gets a total cost
by costing the various components as presently con-
ceived and aggregating those. If he is estimating the
cost of development, he estimates the cost of test
articles, engineering man-hours, etc., as presently
planned and aggregates those. He docs not specify
what performance he is associating with the particular
design nor does he indicate the date at which this
performance is to be operationally available. He is
simply costing^ a physical configuration and/ or the
physical resources contemplated in the current
deve lopment plan
.
As development proceeds, however, these initial
designs and plans are almost invariably changed,
either because of unforeseen technical difficulties
that forestall meeting performance requirements, or
because th« customer decides it is essential that
the equipment be modified so as to keep pace with
changing predictions of enemy capabilities, new
operational concepts, and new technological
possibilities.
. . .
In principle it would be possible to factor
into two parts the total error in cost estimates as
they are prepared : ( 1 ) the part due to errors in
the costing of the configuration supplied to the
cost estimator (i.e., the intrinsic error in cost
estimating) and (2) the part due to changes in the
configuration as development progresses. In practice,
it has not been possible to carry out this separation.
However, it is our belief that the intrinsic errors
in costing a fixed configuration tend to be small
relative to the other source of error in the costing
of most major items of military equipment.
-
In other words, of the two types of error listed
above, requirements uncertainty is generally hold to be
*A. W. Marshall and W. H. Heckling, Predictability
PJL the Costs v_Time A _ and _ Succe s s of Deve lo op;ent , P- 1 8 2
1
(Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1959)
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responsible for the major portion of the factor increases.
In order to minimize requirements uncertainty, the Department
of Defense has introduced the Contract Definition Phase (CDP)
for major defense contracts. A rigorous definition of
requirements prior to contractor selection is intended to





AN EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC TRENDS AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO COST OVERRUN
In a rebuttal to Congressional criticism of C-5A
cost overruns, Lockheed Aircraft's president, A. C. Kotchian,
cited economic inflation as the major cause. He did not
state the specific 'percentage factor of the total overrun
that was attributable to inflation. More recently, the
amount of overrun on the C-5A program attributable to in-
2flation has been stated to be approximately $627 million.
At that time, the total overrun was estimated to be approxi-
mately $1.3 billion. If the $627 million estimate were
correct, inflation would be responsible for 48 percent of
the overrun.
On the other hand, Scherer classifies inflation as
a minor factor, in the C~5A case. In prepared testimony
for the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, he stated:
Economy-wide inflation has been a contributing
factor (to cost overrun) in the last few years,
although it is a little hard to take seriously,
claims that much of the C~5A's 64 percent (of
target price overrun is attributable to this cause
lnThe Inflated Case of the C-5A," Armed Forces
Management ^ Ju 1y } 1969, p. 71
^Hrrold B. Meyers, "For Lockheed, Everything's Coming




when the wholesale price index for metals and metal
products rose by only 11 percent between 1960 and
1968.
*
With the C-5A, as well as with other systems acquired
in the past, there is a considerable difference of opinion
concerning the contribution of inflation to cost overrun.
It appears to be somewhat difficult to specifically
isolate the exact amount of inflation induced cost overrun.
This seems to be particularly true with large systems
acquisition where the total price may exceed $1 billion.
Specifications changes and uncertainties tend to lead to
higher co;;ts and further tend to obscure the portion of over-
run which may be due to economic reasons. For that reason,
this discussion will examine economic trends, rather than
seek an exact overrun inflationary factor. To complete this
task, a presentation of U.S. economic trends is made, followed
by an examination of some specific indicators which may show
a relation to cost overrun. Finally, an examination of some
recent overrun cases, in an attempt to determine intuitively
if the amount of overrun has conformed to the economic
growth trend.
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military
Budget and National Economic Priorities, Hearings, before a




United States Economic Trends (1958-1969)
Beginning in 1958, the United States enjoyed both
price stability and an expanding economy. Until 1965, prices
had been essentially unchanged. Labor costs had barely moved,
as gains in productivity had largely offset moderate increases
in hourly labor costs. The economic expansion continued
through 1965 without the presence of significant inflation.
By December of 1965, the unemployment rate had decreased to
4.1 percent. This rate was just slightly higher than the
4 percent interim goal set by the Kennedy Administration in
91962." The U.S. economy had practically achieved full employ-
ment. Full employment was finally reached in 1966, with a
313 year low unemployment rate of 3.9 percent.
In 1964 and 1965, expansionary tax policies had
stimulated the economy and brought a strong increase in total
demand. Added to this was additional Vietnam expenditures
«hlch made their first impact on the economy in 1966, marking
•^Economic Report of the President, together with
the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, January




^Economic Report of the President, together with the
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, January
1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967) p. 37
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turning point in real economic growth. These factors brought
a shift away from price stability. The price increases vzere
due 5n large measure to the acceleration in the growth of
demand which began in mid- 1965, and to the particularly rapid
increase in output of capital goods and defense products.
Demand had been rising since 1961, but that had been during
a period, when there was an abundant supply of labor and
unused equipment.
The sharp rise in demand for defense products and
capital goods imposed special pressures on ths metals and
machinery industries. In some branches of these industries,
the limit's of efficient utilization were surpassed. In a
few, output was close to the absolute limitations on
3
capacity.
There were also imbalances in the labor markets
which created increasing difficulties as unemployment
declined. Workers in low paid occupations could not be with-
out substantial upward adjustments in wage scales. Wages
began to rise faster at a time when productivity began to
slow down.
President Johnson summarized the reasons for the
upward pressure on prices in his Economic Report:
Price rises can be traced to imbalances created by
the special pressures of Vietnam procurement and booming





, p. 29 2Ikid. , P. 73
3U?M. , P. 73 **Ibid . , p. 74
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exceeded the spaed limits of the Economy's ability
to adjust. Some price ad a was the inevitable cost
of the adjustments required in recovering from a
decade of slack. Wages had to be raised sharply in
underpaid occupations which previously held their labor
only because the alternative was no job at all. Pro-
ducers in once stagnant, low profit industries, saw
opportunities for expansion and found it possible to
raise prices c.7,6. earnings in order to attract needed
capital. Demand pressed harder on skilled occupationr-
and professional services where we had trained too few
persons to meet the needs of a high employment economy.
Some price increases would have still occurred had
we moved at a steadier pace. But these price increases
could have come slowly enough and have been small
enough not to threaten a chain reaction of wages
chasing other wages ~ wages chasing prices - prices
chasing wages ~ and prices chasing other prices.
*
This period marked the end of real growth and overall
economic stability. President Nixon, in l\ backward look at
this period, commented:
"Inflation was in full tide." 2
Through 1967 and 1968, inflation continued unabated.
By the first half of 1969, the rate of price increase reached
5.2 percent, the largest rate of growth since the Korean War.
In the second half of 1969, the rate of increase had subsided
to 4.7 percent. This shift in the rate of price increase
signalled a possible downturn in the economy. The slowdown
was most likely in response to contractionary fiscal and
monetary policies applied commencing in 1967.
'Ibid.
, pp. 5-6
2 Economic Report of the President, together with the
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, February 1970,
(VJashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 6






Specific Economic Indicators (1958-1969)
In examining some specific economic trends, particular
attention is given to labor, wholesale and consumer prices.
1958 is used as the base year.
Labor prices remained at a fairly stable rate of growth
from 1958 through 1965. During that period, the average annual
hourly increase was 6.5 cents. By the end. of 1965, an
accelerated upward trend became apparent. In 1969, hourly
earnings were increasing at a rate of 27.0 cents annually.
Average wages ranged from $2.11 in 1958 to $3.28 in 1969.
Figure 2 lists the average prevailing hourly wage in the
manufacturing industry by year, and graphically illustrates
the accelerating growth rate from 1965 through 1969.
line wholesale price index followed approximately
the same trend as labor from 1958 to 1964. That is, there
was a stable trend through that period. After that, there
was a rapidly increasing upward tendency through 1969. There
appears to be slight differences in the behavior of prices
for machinery and those for metal and metal products. The
price index for metal and metal products began a rapid growth
rate in 1963, two years earlier than the general accelerating
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Adapted from the Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1969 (Washington, D.C,









Year All Metal Machinery
Products
1950 ICO. 4 99.1 100.0
1959 100.6 101.2 102.0
1960 100.7 101.3 102.9
1961 100.3 100.7 102.9
1962 100.6 100.0 102.9
1963 ; 100.3 100.1 103.1
1964 100.5 102.8 103.8
1965 102.5 105.7 105.0
1966 105.9 108.3 108.2
1967 106.1 • 109.6 111.8
I960 108.7 112.4 115.2
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price index for 1958 through 1969. Additionally, the indexes
for metals and machinery are comparatively displayed. The
trends are illustrated graphically.
The consumer price index for the same period is listed
and illustrated graphically in Figure 4. The accelerating
growth in prices between 1965 and 1969 is obvious.
Two significant features of the price data contained
in Figures 2, 3, and 4 relate to the time frame. lor purposes
of analysis, the periods 1958 through 1965, and from 1965
thereafter, are of particular interest. Consumer, wholesale,
and labor prices during the first period increased at almost
a constant rate. Price as a function of time could be
approximated by a relation of the form:
y =s a + bx
VJhile it is true that the data do not exactly match the func-
tion, the least squares line of best fit would result in a
very small amount of dispersion.'
The period after 1965 presents a different trend.
Price as a function of time during that period could best be
described by the equation:
y = abx
An empirical examination of Figures 2, 3, and 4 would tend
to verify these relationships.
A The computational aspects of fitting data with a
least squares line is covered by John E. Freund, Elementary
Bu s i i ! e s; s S t a t i s 1 1c s , (Englewood Cliffs, N.J,: Prentiss-Hall,
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The linear and exponential economic trends just
described would suggest some effect on contract price out«
comes. Contracts negotiated prior to 1965 and completed
subsequent to 1966 might tend to be affected to the greatest
degree. The rationale for this tendency is set forth in the
following paragraph.
Contracts for weapons systems procurement normally
take into account the length of time involved to complete
the task. Further, allowances are made for increases in the
prices of labor and materials based on the best estimates of
economic trends. Projections based on economic performance
prior to 1965 would appear to offer no particular trouble
provided that this trend remained in effect. For projections
made for periods after 1965, based on previous experience,
a cost overrun factor due to inflationary pressures seems
to be involved. For example, the average price of labor in
manufacturing industries increased approximately 2 percent
per year from 1958 to 1965. Assume that a contract negotiated
in January 1964 included labor expected to cost $1 million in
1964 prices. Further assume, that the task required by the
terms of the contract will be completed in December 1969
with labor effort t.o be divided evenly over the period of the
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Military





contract." The final assumption is that the economy will
continue in a stable fashion, and that the cost of labor
should increase at a rate of approximately 2 percent annually,
Based on these assumptions , the projected Labor
costs should approximate $1,087,879 for the term of the
contract. If the contract target price allowed for this
projected cost growth, the final cost should approximate
the target price. No cost overrun is involved, even though
costs are rising. Should labor price not follow a stable
trend, as shov;n in Figure 2, the cost of labor in this con-
tract would amount to approximately SI, 114, 253. Instead of
a stable 2. percent labor cost increase per year , the actual
increase for 1966 through 1969, was 4, 5, 7, and 9 percent
respectively. The difference in cost is $62,901. This
difference is the portion of cost overrun due to abnormal
economic escalation, or inflation. It is noted that the
overrun amounts to approximately 5.9 percent of the labor
target price, over the entire contract period. Table 7
compar€?s these two rates of price increase over the contract-
period.
Application of this example to metal and material
price changes would yield similar trends.. The actual
This assumption is made for illustrative purposes
only. In practice, labor intensity would tend to vary con-
siderably over the contract period depending on the stage of











I te of Cost of
i
Rate of Cost of
Year Change % Labor Change % Labor
1964
, r
2 $ 166,666 2 $ 166,666
1965 2 170,000 2 170,000
1966 2 173,400 4 176,800
1967 2 376,868 5 185,640
1968 2 180,405 7 198,635
1969 2 184,013 9 216,512












. >lesale price index, however ranged from 100.4 in 1958 to
115.1 in 1969. This suggests that the percentage of overrun
due to inflation would tend to be smaller for materials than
labor. The rate of increase was not as great.
The foregoing example assumed a well defined product
with no change during the contract period. With complex
weapons systems, numerous changes and uncertainties add to
the difficulty in isolating the exact factor of overrun
due to abnormal economic trends. Nevertheless, the factor
would appear to be somewhat smaller than stated by the Lock-
heed Corporation. Scherer conceded that simple economic
inflation was surely a contributing factor to cost overrun,
but that it was a relatively minor matter.
Influence of Inflation on Recent
Systems Procurement
The following section is devoted to an examination
of some recent systems acquisitions. Each involve a substan-
tial cost overrun. The causes of the overrun have been
roughly approximated in each case.
Mark II Avionics System for F-lll
Estimates of the cost of the Mark 11 system have
reflected a steady and substantial rate of increase since
Autonetics was selected as the contractor in June 1966. The
following figures indicate the size of this increase:
*U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Military Budget:
and National Economic Priorities, 1 ' 0p__. Cit. , p. 379
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(Mark II Dollar Amounts in Millions)






















Those estimates ware prepared by the contractor.
The cost overruns in this case wore attributed to
Humorous design changes made by Autonetics and the Government^
It is significant that inflation was not considered a major
factor, even though these substantial increases took place
in a period of sharply rising prices. Further, Autonetics
claimed that price increases could not be identified with
any specific change. In its Cost Traceability Report,
submitted on October 2, 1967, Autonetics stated that:
Because of the complex interrelationships of the
activities and changes during the period June 1956 to
April 1967, it is not possible to^estimate the cost
effect of each individual change.
An Air Force Cost Trace Team, in April 1968, analyzed
the Mark II cost increases. Government changes in design
were claimed to be responsible for $20.2 million. The
remainder was deemed caused by contractor design changes,
and poor in-house cost control. Although materials and labor
price increases were contributing factors in part, they were
3




p. 803 2 Ibid .
,
p. 802 3 Ibid. , p. 803
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Loc ' " C-5A Transport
As stated previously, tha procurement of Lockheed's
C~5A transport has been subjected to apparently large over-
runs. The base price was stated to be $3.4 billion, with the
ultimate price reaching approximately $5.4 billion. This
figure is the subject of some dispute in recent months. Not
only is the amount of overrun questioned, but the factors
constituting the overrun appear to be in doubt. The following
estimates were made in November 1968, b}' the Department of
the Air Force, Mr. A.E. Fitzgerald, and Assistant Secretary
Charles:
C-5A Fitzgerald j Air Force Charles




3.4 5.3 3.1 4.3 • * • 5.1
The estimates of overrun due to inflation also varied
2
considerably. Meyers attributed $627 million to inflation.
The Air Force and Fitzgerald cite $500 million and $204 million
3
respectively, as the inflationary portion of the overrun.
Senator Proxmire considers inflation to be less significant
than alleged, and has stated:
1 Ibid.
,
p. 311, 'Meyers , Op. Cit. , p. 77
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Military





According to the Air Force, the cost growth in the
C-5A program has resulted from normal development
problems and inflation. The inflation argument, which
is supposed to account foir $500 million of the cost
growth, appears questionable. The contract contains
a provision to protect the contractor from unfore-
seeable price changes in the economy .... If
future inflation for at least three years was included
in the price, it is h-ard to see why inflation should
be a major factor in later increasing the price.
The preeoading testimony seems to suggest that inflation
might not be as large a factor in a cost overrun situation
as is commonly supposed. At any rate, the range of estimates
is large enough to suggest that the inflationary factor in a
cost overrun cannot be precisely identified.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire speaking
on Senate Bill S-2546, 91st Congress, 1st Sess. , September 4,




The Factors of Cost Overrun
The examination of Government contracting methods,
cost estimating tools, and economic events, tends to support
the assertion that factors leading to cost. overrun pervade
the weapons acquisition process. Apparent overrun factors
emerged in the discussion of each broad area. In some cases,
the factors appeared to be interrelated with tendencies
dependent on twn or more of the areas discussed. However,
in most instances, the problem revolves around uncertainty
or optimism. This discussion will recapitulate the broad
sections previously examined, and draw out the factors that
seem to result in the overrun problem.
Overrun Factors in Goyernmen
t
Con t ra c t in
ft;
In contracting, two factors appear to stand out as
being the chief contributors to cost overrun. These are the







Trie buy- in tendencies were evidently recognized prior
to the 1960's, particularly with the use of CPFF contracts.
Substitution of a larger percentage of incentive contracts
and firm-fixed price contracts apparently failed to stop
this practice. The Fitzgerald and Murphy testimony seem to
indicate that sufficient evidence is available to show that
the practice was used by Autonetics and Lockheed. Similarly,
it may be a reasonable assumption to state that it was used
in some of the systems studied by Marshall and Heckling.
Likewise, other systems would not tend to be immune from
contractor buy- in. It was Congressional concern that caused
the apparent buy- in to be recognized, in the case of the
C»5A arid Mark II. If the buy~in commonly exists, it may go
unnoticed in numerous other systems acquisitions.
Technological uncertainty has been an overrun factor
in the past. From the evidence, it appears that difficulty
will be encountered in the future with systems acquisition.
As an overrun factor, technological uncertainty could be
classified as one which might never be adequately quantified.
That is to say, its existence is recognized and somewhat
taken for granted, but it is likely to remain the greatest
difficulty to realistic target establishment. In air systems
procurement, the degree of departure from designs used in
past systems tend to result in greatest dispersion of costs
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estimates from the true cost. Provided that past performance
data can. be utilized in new systems, the experience could
alt in a narrower and more accurate speculation on the
final co As Schultze pointed out: increased complexity
generally yields increased uncertainty. The uncertainty
in turn, tends to drive costs to a point many times what
was experienced in the past. With technology advancing
constantly, it might be inferred that margins of error could
become larger. At this point, however, evidence does not
support that contention, since cost experience on major
systems has been largely erratic.
The Marshall and Heckling studies seem to point out
( trend. Overrun factors in general ware larger in more
complex systems, such as fighters and missies. They tended
to become smaller in less sophisticated aircraft, such as
transports. This trend appears to indicate a higher overrun
with greater complexity. There is however, no definite
relationship that can be stated from the evidence, that can
be quantified.
A conclusion can be drawn from the relation of
technological uncertainty to cost outcome. Uncertainty
seems to cause initial cost estimates to vary the greatest
degree from final cost. As system development progresses,
the degree of error should become smaller, approaching zero
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as the system approaches completion. It does not appear
that the technological portion of uncertainty can be; signi-
ficantly reduced in future systems. For this reason, it
could continually be the primary cost overrun factor.
Government contracting methods per se, would not
appear to be responsible for overrunning the estimates.
Generally, in a situation of little uncertainty, however,
the firm- fixed price contract may be the most desirable
to employ. On the other hand, where uncertainty is greater,
cost control incentives might be attached. For their part
in the acquisition process, the contract may merely provide
an environment in which cost overrun can take place. CPFF
tends to provide the best environment while FFP, the worst.
The incentive contracts could supply a varying environment,
depending on how well cost controls are applied to the
process, and hoc? effectively the "buy- in" tendency is controlled
Oyerrun .^Factors in Cost Es timating Methods
lndustrial mEnj^ineering Methods . --This method of cost
estimating appears to be of most value where a clearly defined
system is to be produced. Since each task from the Lowest
level of detail must be analyzed and aggregated, the inference
is that industrial engineering could be best employed when
development is fairly advanced. In the typical modern
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vjeapons system, industrial engineering would tend to be subject
to subsequent changes in design and performance specifications.
Therefore, in early stages of the system acquisition, indus-
trial engineering V7ould not be of significant value in
developing the initial systems cost estimates, except for
duplication of components. Contractors tend to avoid this
method.
It could tend to become an overrun factor if solely
employed in the face of i ' tent technological change.
Similarly, it could figure as an overrun factor in a situation
where the whole turns out to be greater than the parts, as
noted by Large.
l^JtA-.1 ifi by Analogy . ~-To employ analogy as a
primary estimating tool, runs the risk as experienced by
Douglas. In some cases, great similarities with past systems
may produce an excellent cost estimate. However, unknovrns
aad technological change entering the proposed system could
greatly reduce the value of the analogy method and introduce
great error. Jt could not be termed as inherently possessing
the tendency to produce an overrun. It must depend on the
particular circumstances and prior data base of the estimate.
Statistical Technique . --The danger is alv/ays present
that data may not be related to a particular system. If
there is no direct relationship, this estimating technique
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could become a cost overrun factor of varying dimensions.
Fretmd's admonition that any projection of past experience
to the uncertain future is speculative and hazardous, is
well taken.
Cost Estimating Methods in General. -~As with the
government contract, any estimating technique is influenced
by the uncertainties of technology, time, and economic
factors. Whether it is industrial engineering, analogy, or
statistical, the method can be an overrun factor only to
the extent that the" method itself is faulty. Marshall and
Meckling concede that it is not possible , in practice, to
isolate the extent of the intrinsic coot estimating error.
In relation to other factors, such "as buy-in
f
estimating
techniques of themselves, do not appear to be a prime
overrun factor.
Overrun a s a Fun c t ion of
_
In f la t ion
To examine a program such as the C-5A, inflation was
conceded to contribute to the overrun. Yet, the range of
estimates on exactly how much it added was great. These
ranged from $204 million to $627 million. Such a range
seems to indicate that the inflation overrun factor is not
really identifiable. Expert testimony of Scherer and
Fitzgerald tend to discount inflation as a prime factor in
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overrun. If the rate of price increase is compared to the
rat 1 sed on past trends, the difference constitutes over-
run. The difference, even in periods of considerable
inflation, such as 1965 to 1969, tends to be relatively small.
It appears that inflation is definitely an overrun factor
to the extent that price growth is not included in govern-
ment contracts. However, this does not seem to be as large
an item as commonly supposed.
Overrun Factor Interrelationships
Buy- In ys„ Optj
Both the Mark II and Skybolt programs resulted in
overruns of considerable magnitude, yet the contractors were
accused of different practices. Autonetics was said to have
attempted a buy- in by submitting an apparently unrealistic
low bid. On the other hand, Douglas made a very low bid on
Skybolt and was thought to be overly optimistic. The
difference between the two appears to be difficult to
separate. It is possible that it is largely a matter of
semantics. Yet, it could very well be based on the contractor
intent. In order to further isolate overrun factors , it is
inferred that the buy-in constitutes a deliberately low bid,
v;hile the Douglas Skybolt case is one of optimism based on
overaiobitious development attempts. The study differentiates
between the two on that basis.
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Contr; x and Estimating
Although contracting and estn iting were examii
as separate entities, they seep, to be closely related to
each other. The value of the contract, or whether or not
the final cost equals the expected cost, is dependent on
the initial cost estimate. While estimating may possess
some not too clearly defined faults of itself, it seems to
be inseparably attached to the contracting process. The
cost overrun factor, therefore, seems to be a tendency
or trend that was not, or could not be applied to the
estimating method. The estimating method by itself, does
not appear to constitute a serious overrun factor.
Cost Overrun Factors Summarized
As a result of the evidence, testimony, and cases
examined, the following factors are set forth as the
apparent prime overrun factors
:
(1) Technological uncertainty may be the most
serious causative agent. There is simply not a significant
step that can be taken to eliminate it.
(2) An apparently strong contractor incentive to
deliberately make a low estimate in order to buy-in on a
program.
(3) The optimism that pervades initial program
decision making, with a resulting unrealisticaily low
contract bid.
(4) Simple economic inflation; and probably the
least serious of any overrun factor.
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Application of Overrun Factors
to the Estimating Process
Three of four overrun factors cited are of a highly
intangible nature. Buy- in and optimistic tendencies seem
to be largely subjective and not readily adaptable to
c titif ication. Technological uncertainty is an unknown
of varying degrees.
This study has uncovered no relationships, either
expressed or inferred, that would tend to show that overrun
factors could eventually be applied to the estimating
process.
The fourth factor, inflation, is in theory capable
of being expressed in concrete terms. However, its complex
interaction with the other factors- make it extremely diffi-
cult to isolate. Apparently, general trends can be
.
demonstrated, but exact definitions shall probably remain
a part of the unknown.
Conclusion
Cost overrun, as a definite factor in system acquisition,
has apparently been greatly oversimplified. Critics seem
especially ready to cite the original cost estimate and
compare this to the final system cost. The difference, or
apparent overrun, is attributed to a variety of reasons,
as previously examined. However, what is often stated to be

overrun is not really overrun. Original specifications are
changed, or the con< spt of the program is alt< 3. Chang
and alterations have a tendency to change the total cost of
the program. In other vrords
s
added program benefits can be
equated with added increments of cost. The real cost over-
run must be considered as the cost not associated with the
change in program scope.
As increasingly complex systems are developed and
pro" 1, change appears to remain a persistent byproduct
of future acquisitions. For this reason, the real cost
overruns which may occur, might constitute the most elus:'.
e len-ent in systems procurement.

APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 7000.2
Subject: Performance Measurement for Selected Acquisitions.
References: (a) DOD Directive 7000.1, "Resoux-ce Man •._.. :nt
Systems of the Department cf Defense,"
August 22, 1965
(b) DOD Directive 3200.9, "Initiation of
Engineering and Operational Systems
Development," July 1, 1955
(c) Armed Services Procurement Regulations
.(1963 Edition)
(d) KIL-STD-881 (to be published)
I. PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
This Instruction sets forth objectives and criteria and
authorises the publication of a guide, within the purview
of reference (a), for the application of uniform DOD require-
ments for contractors' management control systems to selected
Defense contracts. The provisions of this Instruction require
the use of Cost/ Schedule* Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) in
selected acquisitions and apply to all Military Departments
and Defense Agencies (hereinafter referred to as DOD Com-
ponents) which are responsible for acquisitions during engin-
eering development, operational systems development and
production.
II. SCOPE
A. The acquisitions governed by this Instruction will be
in selected contracts within programs which are estimated in
the Five Yea?: Defense Program to require (1) a total cumula-
tive financing for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
in excess of $25 million or (2) cumulative production invest-
ment in excess of $100 million. Finn fixed-price contracts
will be excluded.
B. Subcontracts within applicable programs, excluding




application of these criteria by mutual agreement between
•actors and the contract ing DOD Component,
ac< g to the criticality of the subcontract to the
program. Coverage of certain critical subcontracts may be
directed by the DOD subject to the changes article of the
contracts.
III. OBJECTIVE
A. DOD contractors should be continuously alert to
adv. being developed in management control systems to
improve their contract performance, and to serve DOD and
their best interests. It is an objective of this Instruction
to bring to the attention of and encourage DOD contractors
to accept and install management control systems and procedures
which are most effective in meeting their requirements.
B. To provide an adequate basis for responsible decision
making by both contractor management and DOD Components
,
contractors' internal management control systems must pro-
vide data which (1) indicate work progress 5 (2) properly
relate cost
s
schedule, and technical performance, (3) are
valid 9 timely, and auditable, and (4) supply DOD managers
with a practicable level of summarization.
IV. POLICY AND PROCEDURES
A. Policy
It shall be the general policy to (1) require application
of the DOD criteria as stated in Enclosure 1 to programs that
are within the scope of Section II above, (2) require no
changes in contractors' existing management control systems
except those necessary to meet the criteria, and (3) require
the contractor to use data from his own management control
system in reports to the Government.
B. Procedures
The procedures contained herein will not be construed as
requiring the use of specific systems, or changes in accounting
systems which will adversely affect the equitable distribution
of costs to all contracts. To avoid the proliferation of
demands on contractors for demonstrations of thoir management
systems, the criteria outlined in Enclosure 1 shall be incor-
porated in a basic agreement between the DOD and the contractor
wherever feasible and will apply to more than one contract.

86
However, agreements concerning the acceptability and use of
contractors' i >.: control systems may be accomplished
by the use of basic ag3:eements, or through separate pro-
curement contracts
.
1 • Basic Agreement
a. The use of a basic agreement contemplates the execution
of a wr :'• t te ;• i in s t r i r i e n t which in c 1ud s s C/ S C3 C and nego t ia te
d
provisions which (1) reflect an understanding between the





and (2) identify the specific system(s) which the
contractor intends to use of applicable contracts with DOD
Components. The basic agi it will include a written
description of the system(s) validated in a demonstration
review in sufficient detail to permit adequate surveillance
by all interested parties. The use of a basic agreement in
these circumstances is preferred where a number of separate
contracts 1 ; . en one or more DOD Component(s) and the con-
tractor ma}7 be entered into during the term of the basic
agreement. It contemplates the delegation of authority
to the cognizaut POD Component negotiating the basic agree-*
i ;t by all other DOD Components in order that it represent
an understanding between the contractor and all prospective
DOD contracting components. The basic agreements will be
entered into pursuant to Section 3-410 of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation (reference (c)).
b. Action to develop a basic agreement may be initiated:
(3.) Unilaterally by the contractor;
(2) By a DOD Component request to the contractor; and
(3) By either the contractor or the DOD Component,
as the result of a contractor's response to a R.equest
for Proposal (RFP).
c. A basic agreement may be arrived at after evaluation
of the contractor's management control system in the context
of the criteria, within the contractor's present or proposed
operating environment and not necessarily in response to an
RFP. The management control system(s) identified in the
basic agreement will also be subjected to a demonstration
review which may occur within the contractor's present
environment, or in conjunction with the contractor's imple-
mentat ion of a separate DOD procurement contract.
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2„ Sej Procure it Contracts
As a result of either the req-uirei nt normally placed in an
RFP or an action initiated by DOD Com] nt-s , the contractor
will provide a response which describes the integration of
the basic subsystems to provide control of cost, schedule,
and technical performance. This involves:
a
.
Evaluation . --The contracting DOD Component will conduct
a design revj as a part of normal procu nent procedures to
insure that the systems meet established criteria. When the
systems have been evaluated and the contract awarded, the
contracting DOD Component will notify the contractor of the
results.
b. Demons ion . --D0D personnel will conduct an in -plant
d . . of the contractor's management control
systems. The purpose of systems demonstrations is to verify
that the contractor is operating systems which meet the
criteria. Upon completion of this demonstration, a written
description of the system validated will be provided by the
contractor in sufficient detail to permit adequate
surveillance.
3 . Demonstration Teai
a. The team conducting a demonstration review will
ordinarily include representatives from the Arm}/, Navy, Air
Force (except where a Service requests nonparticipation due
to n on involvement ) , and the cognizant Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) Auditor. The contracting or cognizant DOD
Component will provide the team leader and will be responsible





a. In the event the contractor's system fails to pass the
dx ':,eastrat ion review, the cognizant DOD Component will dis-
cuss the specific shortcomings with the contractor and
require the ' contractor to submit proposals for correcting
deficiencies. Subsequent to official notification by the
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cognizant DOD Component of a failure, the portion (s) of the
management control system that failed may be subjected to a
follow-up review. Specific guidance and procedures con-
cerning determination and resolution of failures are contained
in the Guide for Performance Measurement.
b. Upon successful completion of demonstration review,
contractors will not be subjected to re-exam5.nation (other
than through normal surveillance), unless there are positive
indications that the contractor's system no longer meets the
criteria.
V. RESPONSIBILITIES
The DCAA will review the contractor's accounting system
and determine the accuracy and reliability of the financial
data contained in the reports prepared from the contractor's
systems and reported data will be accomplished by the cog-
nisant plant representative. The cognizant auditor and the
plant representative will collaborate in reviewing areas of
joint interest.
A. The surveillance reviews will consist of (1) recurring
evaluations of the effectiveness of the contractor's policies
and procedures to produce valid data consistent with the in-
tent of this Instruction, and (2) selec ive tests of reported
data.
B. The cognizant auditor will submit a formal report of any
deficiencies that cannot be resolved with the contractor,
to the contracting DOD Component (s) through the local plant
repre sen ta t ive
.
VI. GUIDE
A. The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) (OASD(C)) will publish, revise as necessary,
and distribute the Guide for Performance Measurement separately
from this Instruction.
B. The OASD(C) will maintain surveillance over the
procedures prescribed in the Guide for Performance Measurement
and insure implementation and continuous operation in a uni-
form manner throughout the Department of Defense.
C. Until the Guide for Performance Measurement is published,
application of the criteria to ongoing or proposed programs
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and associated reporting requirements will be subject to prior
approval by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
(ASD(C)) or his designee for the purpose, with the concurrence
of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).
VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AMD IMPLEMENTATION
This Instruction is effective immediately. Two (2) copies
of the proposed implementation documents will be forwarded to
trie ASD(C) within ninety (90) days after the date of this
Instruction. Imp] menting instructions will not bo published
until thirty (3) days after their submission to ASD(c) for
their review.
R. N. ANTHONY,
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